



THE RIPPLE AND WASHBACK EFFECTS OF WAR: AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE GAZA WAR ON ISRAEL

¹Hasbi Aswar, ²Herman Felani, ³Dewi Masitoh, ⁴Alfredha Shinta Putri, ⁵Derina Faslig Silitonga

^{1,3,4,5}Department of International Relations, Universitas Islam Indonesia

²Department of Communication Science, Universitas Islam Indonesia

*Corresponding Email: hasbiaswar@uii.ac.id

Submission: June 30, 2026 | Revised: September 25, 2026 | Accepted: September 28, 2026

ABSTRAK

Sejak Oktober 2023, Perang Gaza tidak hanya menimbulkan eskalasi kekerasan di Palestina, tetapi juga memunculkan efek gelombang yang signifikan terhadap Israel di berbagai sektor. Dengan menggunakan pendekatan ripple effect dan washback of war, tulisan ini menganalisis bagaimana perang tersebut menghasilkan gelombang dampak berjenjang yang mempengaruhi aspek material, ekonomi, dan politik baik domestik maupun internasional bagi Israel. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode kualitatif melalui pengumpulan data dari sumber-sumber pemerintah Israel dan jurnal-jurnal ilmiah yang terkait dengan perang Israel-Gaza sejak tahun 2023. Temuan dari kajian ini menunjukkan bahwa perang tersebut telah menimbulkan dampak yang signifikan terhadap Israel, baik di tingkat domestik maupun internasional, yang mencakup disrupsi ekonomi, perubahan persepsi publik Israel, dan perubahan sikap masyarakat global terhadap Israel, termasuk di kalangan negara-negara yang secara historis pro-Israel. Kontribusi dari kajian ini adalah upaya untuk melihat sisi lain dari perang Israel-Gaza, yang selama ini lebih banyak dipotret dari sisi Gaza sebagai korban yang menderita kerugian besar.

Kata kunci: Israel, Perang Gaza, Politik Domestik, Ripple Effect, Washback of War

ABSTRACT

Since October 2023, the Gaza War has not only triggered an escalation of violence in Palestine but has also produced a significant ripple effect on Israel across multiple sectors. Employing a ripple effect and washback of war framework, this paper analyzes how the war has generated cascading waves of impact affecting the material, economic, and political dimensions — both domestic and international — for Israel. This study adopts a qualitative method through data collection from Israeli government sources and academic journals related to the Israel-Gaza war since 2023. The findings reveal that the war has had a substantial impact on Israel, both domestically and internationally, encompassing economic disruption, shifts in Israeli public perception, and an increasingly critical change in global attitudes toward Israel, including among countries that have historically been pro-Israel. The contribution of this study lies in its attempt to examine the other side of the Israel-Gaza conflict, which has predominantly been portrayed through the lens of Gaza as the party suffering the greatest losses.

Keywords: Israel, Gaza War, Domestic Politics, Ripple Effect, Washback of War

BACKGROUND

The Gaza War, which re-erupted on October 7, 2023, has become one of the most destructive wars in the history of the Palestinian war since 1948. Hamas' initial attack on Israeli territory killed more than 1,200 people and took hundreds of Israelis hostage, triggering a large-scale and prolonged Israeli military response. This escalation developed into land, air, and sea operations targeting Gaza and triggered regional tensions in Lebanon, Iran, Syria, and the Red Sea (Sobelman, 2026).

Various global efforts have been made to respond to the Israeli attack on Gaza, including both bilateral and multilateral efforts. For example, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly passed a resolution supporting a two-state solution and the recognition of Palestine. In addition, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued a legal opinion declaring Israel's occupation illegal and ordering a halt to acts of genocide and access to humanitarian aid, affirming the obligation of states not to assist the occupation. This includes the International Criminal Court (ICC), which since the beginning of 2024, has ordered Israel to stop the Genocide in Gaza (Aswar et al., 2025).

In addition to diplomatic channels, global public action took place massively: large demonstrations took place in cities around the world, such as Jakarta, London, and New York, demanding an end to genocide and urging a permanent ceasefire. International solidarity movements, including the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) campaign, are gaining momentum, pressuring companies and governments that support Israel (Masitoh et al., 2025).

Although Israel managed to wreak havoc on Gaza and killed key figures such as Ismail Haniyeh and Yahya Sinwar, and thousands of other Hamas fighters, this did not stop Hamas' resistance in Gaza. According to former United States Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Hamas managed to recruit as many new fighters as those killed during the war. However, Israel also did not succeed in making Gazans turn against Hamas and Gaza fighters (Berman, 2025; Humaid & Salhani, 2025).

Furthermore, there has been a change in international dynamics in response to the Gaza incident, namely the pressure and criticism of the world public that is increasingly strong and unified against Israel. Israel's Western partner states are also beginning to change their positions by slowly distancing themselves from Israel and recognizing Palestinian independence (Ali, 2025). In the domestic context, Israelis, especially the families of kidnapped victims and the anti-war activists, are also frustrated with the ongoing war and the prisoners of war who have not been released by the fighters in Gaza (Lehmann & ToI Staff, 2025).

Israel's attack on Gaza, aimed at destroying Hamas until a ceasefire occurs in October 2025, has not been achieved. This shows the failure of the Israeli mission and the political victory of Hamas in the Gaza War, as acknowledged by Giora Eiland, former chairman of Israel's National Security Council, who said that the Palestinian group Hamas has won the Gaza War and prevented Israel from achieving its goals. According to Eiland, this war is a great failure of Israel in Gaza for the simple reason that Hamas has not only succeeded in preventing Israel from achieving its goals but also remains in power (Khalil, 2025).

During the Gaza War, various studies have attempted to explore the impact of the war on both the Palestinian and Israeli sides. From the Palestinian side, numerous researchers have conducted studies on the economic impact, migration, and physical and mental health (Butter, 2024; Ewelike et al., 2024; Ince et al., 2024; Youssef & Shehada, 2025). From Israel's side, the various economic and health impacts of the war were also discussed (Kaim et al., 2025; Mayer et al., 2024; Schein, 2024). Although these studies discuss various aspects, no study has focused on comprehensively discussing the impact of the Gaza War on both Gaza itself and Israel, and the impact of the war on the political dynamics in Gaza and Israel.

This research specifically seeks to answer how the Gaza War has had ripple and washback effects on Israel in terms of political, security, economic, social, and

diplomatic aspects. This study focuses on Israel, considering that for the first time in history, the Israeli war on Gaza has had a major and broad impact on Israel, not only economically but also politically at the domestic and international levels. Therefore, this research aims to address the following question: How has the Gaza War generated a multidimensional ripple and washback effect of war across Israel's domestic and international spheres?

LITERATURE REVIEW

The approach used in this study is the ripple and washback effect of the war introduced by Bocquillon et al. (2024) when examining the impact of the war between Russia and Ukraine. This approach was chosen after Bocquillon et al. compared various studies on the impact of war written by researchers, including economic, humanitarian, domestic political, regional political, and diplomatic aspects. However, these authors discussed the impact of war separately from only one side. Therefore, the authors emphasize the importance of viewing the impact of war comprehensively and its interconnectedness. Bocquillon et al. (2024) argue that war can affect various levels of society and that these impacts influence each other. These ripple and washback effects of war encompass direct damage to people and material resources; human capabilities; the economy; values and attitudes; policies and governance; and domestic and international power relations. These six categories are arranged based on the depth and breadth of the war's consequences.

First, material impact includes the loss of life and physical injuries suffered by military personnel and civilians, which have long-term impacts. This damage includes the destruction of material infrastructure, such as buildings, communication facilities, and military facilities and equipment. This material impact affects the second point: human capabilities affect people's opportunities to utilize their capabilities, such as life, physical health, sensory and mental imagination, and control over their

environment. War impacts human capabilities due to the loss or disruption of educational resources, health services, and employment. Furthermore, injuries can render people unable to perform previous occupations (Bocquillon et al., 2024).

The third impact is that war has broader economic consequences that can also undermine human opportunities. Economic supply chains can be affected as a result of the destruction of infrastructure and resources. War mobilization can affect the workforce and economic production. Economic actors may also act strategically to mobilize resources elsewhere to support the war effort because the war has affected incentive structures, or decide to halt production altogether due to expected losses. These impacts can be localized within the conflict-affected geographic region but also have ripple effects throughout the wider region and the global economy. Patterns of production, consumption, trade, inflation, growth, and employment can all be affected (Bocquillon et al., 2024).


The fourth impact of war is that people rethink their values, beliefs, and attitudes, such as shifting identities due to new enemies, and perceptions of themselves and others are reshaped or strengthened. Those in conflict zones may see their feelings and values toward others—both friend and foe—hardened or reshaped. Those outside the immediate conflict zone may also develop new or reframed perceptions about the aggressor and those attacked. Attitudes may shift in favor of or against certain countries and populations (Bocquillon et al., 2024).

Fifth, there is the impact on governance and policy change. At the governmental level, warring countries divert attention and resources toward the conflict—and this also affects governance and other policy areas. Power may be concentrated around the executive branch to handle emergencies, to the detriment of other institutions, including Parliament. For democracies, this can lead to democratic backsliding due to reduced accountability for decisions (Bocquillon et al., 2024).

In wartime, the economy may be regulated differently, for example, with new taxes, to fund military efforts. Other policies may be scrapped altogether in the face of emergencies—or reoriented toward the conflict. Governments outside the immediate conflict zone may redirect resources to support or oppose the conflicting parties: aid may be provided to support the war effort, and humanitarian support may be offered to those fleeing the war. However, third-party governments may also adjust policies to respond to the indirect external impacts of war, such as economic shocks, supply chain disruptions, or inflation. These policy changes, in turn, can affect other political entities, whether coordinated or not.

All of these interrelated effects converge in the final, sixth domain of impact: power relations and interpersonal relationships. Relations between states, organizations, and social classes can change due to conflict and shifts in other layers of impact. Some cooperation and interpersonal relationships may even end as a result of the war (Bocquillon et al., 2024).

Figure 1.
The Concept of Ripple and Washback Effects of War



Source: Bocquillon et al. (2024)

The impacts of war and conflict are indicated in Figure 1 above by green arrows, from the closest to the most distant impact. However, according to Bocquillon et al.

(2024), the impacts of war do not occur linearly. Although each layer is connected to all the others and can create ripples, not all are necessarily affected. For example, material damage and loss of life in conflict can have a strong influence on changes in values and attitudes of the domestic and international public, or they may not.

Developments in the layers above also provide feedback through washback effects. For example, the impact on changes in public perception or attitudes of other countries toward the perpetrators of the war can influence the course of the conflict, for example, ending the war quickly or even prolonging it (Bocquillon et al., 2024).

Although the concept of ripple and washback effects of war is used by Bocquillon et al. to discuss the war between Russia and Ukraine, it is also relevant to discuss the case of Gaza, especially for Israel, which is the main focus as the strongest party in this war. Israel's attitude in the war sparked changes in public attitudes within its domestic politics, including the international public, and changed the regional and international political constellation, especially in terms of responding to Israel and Gaza during the war.

METHODOLOGY

This study uses a qualitative approach with a descriptive-explanatory design to understand the layered dynamics of the impact of the Gaza War on Israel from the perspective of the ripple and washback effects of the war. This approach was chosen to explore how the war causes waves of direct, indirect, and external impacts that affect Israel's political, economic, social, and international stability. Data collection in this study was conducted using primary and secondary data. Primary data were obtained from the Israeli government, and secondary data were collected through a documentary study of reports from various international media, including international institutions, scientific journals, and media articles. Data analysis was carried out through thematic analysis by mapping the patterns of the impact of war

based on the six layers of effects in the ripple and washback effects concept. First, the material impact; second, the impact on human capabilities; third, the economic impact; fourth, changes in values, identity, and attitudes; fifth, changes in governance and policies; and sixth, shifting power relations, both at the domestic and international levels.

DISCUSSION

The Gaza war has caused significant regional tensions and has had global geopolitical implications. In the Middle East, the conflict has strengthened the escalation between Palestinian resistance groups and countries that have played a strategic role, especially Iran, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen, who have openly shown support for Gaza. Since October 2023, tensions have continued to increase, especially from three main fronts: Gaza through the guerrilla war strategy of Hamas forces; Hezbollah has carried out attacks targeting northern Israeli territory; and the Houthis have attacked from Yemen, including disrupting ship traffic in the Red Sea. The Houthis' stance has disrupted global economic stability due to increased risks to trade routes in the Red Sea, causing more than 30 percent of global cargo ships to divert their routes and increasing the world's logistics costs. In early 2024, several European-based automakers announced temporary production halts due to delays in obtaining automotive parts from Asia. Automotive component manufacturers, in particular, have high export revenues from China to Europe and the United States (J.P. Morgan, 2024).

At the domestic level in Arab countries, the humanitarian impact of the Gaza War is triggering tremendous public pressure. Massive protests took place in Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Kuwait, and Tunisia, some of which involved hundreds of thousands of participants aimed at getting the governments of those countries to take a tougher stance against Israel. However, in some of these countries, demonstrators have

received a strong response from the ruling regime. Among the demonstrators, many were arrested by security forces, as in Jordan and Egypt. In Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, actions are relatively limited because of the state repression that has occurred in these countries for a long time (El Kurd, 2024). In contrast, Turkey's mass actions had an impact on government policies that became more decisive towards Israel, such as Turkey suspending certain trade relations with Israel (Jones, 2024).

The Gaza War has also caused polarization between major power blocs. The United States and European countries such as Germany, Britain, Italy, and France have been major contributors to Israel militarily, while most countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America have strongly condemned Israel's military operations and called for a permanent ceasefire. South Africa even took this issue to the ICJ with an indictment of genocide violations committed by Israel against Gaza (Berg, 2024). The ICC also issued arrest warrants for Hamas leaders Ismail Haniyeh, Yahya Sinwar, and Mohammed Deif, as well as Israeli officials, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant (Gritten, 2024).

The impact of the war on the Gaza Strip is extraordinarily large in terms of infrastructure, social, economic, and psychological aspects. Until the October 2025 ceasefire, more than 70,000 Palestinians were reported dead, with approximately 70 percent of the victims being women and children. The number of injured residents exceeded 170,000 (Al Jazeera, 2025), while more than 1.9 million residents, approximately 85 percent of Gaza's population, were forced to evacuate due to the destruction of homes and residential areas. Intense attacks caused more than 83 percent of homes to be completely destroyed or severely damaged, and the entire network of essential infrastructure was critically damaged (Tookey, 2025). At least 14 of the 35 hospitals were affected, while at least 267 places of worship and 86 percent of schools were destroyed. Of the 35 hospitals built in the war zone, only 14 remain

partially functional. The drainage network in Gaza is also disrupted, and 83 percent of groundwater wells are no longer operating (Kumparan News, 2024).

The Impact of the Gaza War on Israel

War is never a stand-alone event. The impact is not only limited to the area of battle but also spreads widely to various dimensions of social, economic, and political life. To understand this complexity, Bocquillon et al. (2024) introduced the concept of the ripple and washback effects of war, which is the idea that war produces a series of consecutive effects that spread like waves to various walks of life. These waves not only reach the countries directly involved, but also the regional and the international system more broadly. This approach is mapped into six main categories that describe the depth and breadth of the consequences of war.

Material

The war that began as a result of the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, caused significant physical and economic damage in Israel. The infrastructure in the southern border area was severely damaged. Rocket attacks and infiltration by Hamas have caused significant damage to homes and infrastructure in southern Israel. Many homes and public buildings in the Negev border community were damaged or destroyed during the attack. Transportation facilities, including highways and railways, were disrupted because of security closures. In addition, attacks carried out by Hamas have hit the country's oil pipeline near Ashkelon, which could trigger a major fire (Republika, 2024).

On October 7, 2023, approximately 1,200 Israelis, mostly civilians, lost their lives, and the death toll continued to rise, with approximately 210 Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers killed in subsequent operations (Reuters, 2023b). Since then, Israeli military operations in Gaza have further increased the number of military casualties.

As of January 2024, 210 IDF soldiers had died (Reuters, 2024). In 2025, the IDF recorded 151 soldiers killed (Holcman, 2025). The number of civilian and military casualties since October 2023 has reached approximately 2,039, according to a report by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Scheer & Rabinovich, 2023). Hundreds of residents experienced minor to severe injuries.

According to data from the IDF, 968 military personnel were killed in 2026 since the start of the war on October 7, 2023, and 6,424 personnel were injured since that day. Of those injured, the IDF recorded 958 serious injuries, 1,572 moderate injuries, and 3,894 light injuries. In October 2024, the Israeli ministry reported that approximately 12,000 soldiers and security personnel had entered the rehabilitation system in Israel, with approximately 8,500 (66 percent) suffering physical injuries. In its 2025 report, the State Comptroller stated that as of the end of March 2025, there had been 45,798 direct damages to buildings during the Swords of Iron War (State Comptroller of Israel, 2025).

Human Capabilities

The escalating Israeli-Palestinian conflict since October 2023 has resulted in problems with education and health services in Israel. Schools are often closed during wars, and the distance learning system has not fully reached all children (Chiim, 2026). Hospitals, such as Soroka Medical Center in Beersheba, have had difficulty treating thousands of victims. They provided care to 674 patients who were injured on the day of the attack on October 7, 2023, and a total of 4,000 war patients since that day (Segaloff, 2025).

Psychosocial influences are also widely felt. A national survey showed that approximately 29 percent of Israeli adults experienced post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) after the October 7 attacks, a doubling of what it was before the attacks, and there was a spike in depressive disorders (42–44 percent) (Columbia Psychiatry, 2024).

Children are highly susceptible to attacks. UNICEF notes that children in Israel experience extreme suffering, including death, trauma, kidnapping, injury, starvation, and school dropout (UNICEF, 2025).

Israel's internal economy has also been severely affected. The Bank of Israel estimates that the mobilization of troops has reduced gross domestic product (GDP) by approximately NIS 177 billion since the war began. The tourism industry and microenterprises are severely affected, while labor shortages, due to military mobilization, suppress job opportunities and trigger inflation (Frankel, 2024). The Bank of Israel also noted the largest reduction in labor participation among young men (20–34 years old) due to military involvement, which was related to the onset of family stress (wives switching husbands).

The government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Israel have implemented various coping initiatives in responding to the situation, such as the transition to online learning, the establishment of 16 community trauma centers to reach approximately 200,000 individuals annually through the Mental Health in the Community program, and evidence-based mental health interventions in schools and hospitals (Jewish Federations, 2024). This includes the establishment of trauma centers, emergency counseling hotlines, such as ERAN, extensive training for therapists, and PTSD treatment in hospitals (Mevorach et al., 2025).

Economic

The Gaza War has impacted the Israeli economy, particularly through labor market shocks, a surge in inflation, disruptions to trade and logistics, credit and financing constraints, expanding fiscal burdens, reduced overall GDP growth, and disruptions in the energy and food sectors. The Israeli-Palestinian war has forced industries in Israel to reduce their activities or seek new workers. The economic gap between vulnerable and poor groups is widening; for instance, low-income families

face severe financial distress, displacement has disrupted children's education, and elderly individuals struggle to access healthcare. According to the IMF, Israel's economy is projected to grow by only 2.9 percent in 2025 compared to pre-war expectations. Economists emphasize that security uncertainty and ongoing conflict severely hamper domestic and foreign investment as well as household consumption in Israel (IMF Communications Department, 2026).

Simultaneously, some 143,000 residents were evacuated from conflict areas, while nearly 300,000 reservists served in the reserves during the first year of the war. Meanwhile, Israel's economy still needs production, as it does not have enough people to run it as it did before the war. The pressure in the labor market was immediately felt in growth and production activities. In 2024, Israel's GDP will only grow by 0.9 percent, while the business sector output will contract by 0.8 percent (Bank of Israel, 2025).

Among these dimensions, the economic fallout is most acutely felt in Israel's labor sector. Before the war, the number of non-Israeli workers in Israel was estimated at approximately 327,000, roughly split between Palestinian and foreign workers. Furthermore, the tourism industry and micro-enterprises have been severely affected, while widespread labor shortages caused by military mobilization continue to suppress employment opportunities and fuel inflationary pressures (Frankel, 2024).

More specifically, Palestinian workers played a crucial role in sustaining the Israeli economy prior to the conflict, particularly in labor-intensive sectors such as construction and agriculture. Approximately 156,000 Palestinians worked in Israel before October 2023, accounting for about one-third of the construction workforce (Bank of Israel, 2025). After the war broke out, approximately 140,000 Palestinian workers also stopped entering Israel, and approximately 13,000 foreign workers left the country, resulting in a significant labor shortage. Although Israel has attempted to replace them by increasing the number of foreign workers, the workforce size remains

below pre-war levels, especially in the construction sector (Bank of Israel, 2025). This labor shortage has also impacted economic activity; investment levels at the end of 2024 remained about 15 percent lower than pre-war levels, a decline partly attributed to the shortage of construction workers following restrictions on Palestinian labor (OECD, 2025). These conditions demonstrate that Palestinian workers constitute a vital part of the workforce supporting key sectors of the Israeli economy (Bank of Israel, 2025).

Beyond internal labor constraints, the Gaza War has also put pressure on Israel's trade sector as its impact extends to global logistics routes, especially in the Red Sea region and the Suez Canal, following Houthi attacks on commercial vessels linked to the conflict in Gaza. Because of the attacks, many shipping companies avoided the Red Sea and chose to detour through the Cape of Good Hope in Africa, increasing Israeli costs, travel time, and trade uncertainty. The activity of Israel's port, Eilat, plummeted by 85 percent due to Houthi attacks and ship route diversion. Moreover, the diversion of the route has increased the China-Israel shipping distance by 114 percent, and the cost of Israel's maritime imports from Asia, Oceania, and East Africa has increased to approximately US\$20 billion by 2023 (Etkes & Feldman, 2024).

From the electricity sector, Israel's position is relatively safer because its main source of electricity is still largely supported by natural gas. In 2023, natural gas accounted for 70 percent of power plant inputs, coal for 17 percent, and renewable energy for 12.5 percent. This composition gives Israel a sizable reserve of power from within the country, so the war does not immediately turn into a serious electricity crisis (International Trade Administration, 2026). However, this does not mean that the energy sector is completely free from pressure. According to a Reuters report, at the beginning of the conflict, Israel closed the Tamar gas field in the Mediterranean Sea for security reasons, and this closure was followed by a decline in gas exports of

approximately 70 percent and economic losses estimated at around 800 million shekels per month (Reuters, 2023a).

In the food sector, the pressure is felt more heavily not only because domestic production is disrupted but also because imports cannot quickly close the supply shortage. Reuters reported that Israel's inflation in August 2024 rose to 3.6 percent, and this increase was due to several factors, namely, the price of fresh produce, food, housing, transportation, education, and entertainment (Scheer, 2025). Israel's food import efforts have also been unable to meet domestic needs because local food prices are 12 percent more expensive than international prices (OECD, 2025).

Accumulating pressures from labor shortages, trade disruptions, and food costs have directly driven up national inflation in Israel. Supply barriers disrupt the normal distribution of goods, logistics costs continue to rise, and increasingly tight labor market conditions add to price pressure. The Bank of Israel noted that in 2024, Israel's annual inflation would reach 3.2 percent, with inflation of tradable goods—that is, goods that can be traded across countries and are greatly influenced by global import costs, exchange rates, and logistics—at 2.8 percent, while inflation of non-tradable goods and services—that is, components that are generally consumed domestically and are more influenced by labor costs, local distribution, as well as domestic pressures—at 3.5 percent. This is coupled with the household sector, where food prices and housing services rose by 4.3 percent and 4.1 percent, respectively (Bank of Israel, 2025). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) also showed that Israel's economic recovery was accompanied by rising inflation, from 2.5 percent in February 2024 to 3.5 percent in September 2024, partly due to continuing supply constraints (OECD, 2025).

Inflation during the war cannot be explained by a single factor but by the accumulation of various interrelated economic burdens. First, economic risks increase, making costs more expensive. Second, the labor shortage makes the production and

distribution processes less efficient. Third, increased war and government spending are adding pressure to the economy (Bank of Israel, 2025). Israel also received substantial external support, particularly from the United States, which helped finance part of the rising military and war-related expenditures and therefore eased some of the fiscal burden on the Israeli government (Schein, 2024). But this aid did not automatically result in lower inflation, as the bulk of the support was directed toward defense and military needs rather than addressing domestic supply constraints. Shortages of Palestinian and foreign labor, production disruptions, and capacity limitations in sectors such as construction continued to hinder domestic supply, even as economic activity gradually recovered (Bank of Israel, 2025). At the same time, high government and military spending continued to sustain domestic demand, thereby creating additional price pressures amid limited supply.

In the fiscal sector, the war has forced the Israeli government to spend a huge amount on war and reach around US\$51 billion, or about 10 percent of Israel's national income in 2022, while in the first three weeks of the war alone, the figure has reached US\$7.5 billion. The cost of the war per day is estimated at US\$269 million, the monthly budget deficit is about US\$6 billion, and Israel has to borrow approximately US\$8 billion from international capital markets through the issuance of government bonds to institutional and other investors from various countries to help finance the war. By 2025, Israel's total losses will have exceeded 150 billion shekels (US\$48 billion), equivalent to approximately 8.6 percent of the annual GDP (Cordall, 2026a; Seker, 2024). This impact has not been calculated as part of the total impact of the war with Iran, the Houthis, and Hezbollah.

Consequently, the pressure on the state budget during the war extended to the financial sector, although the conditions had not yet reached a crisis. The Bank of Israel noted that household credit grew by 6.6 percent in 2024, higher than the 2.3 percent growth in 2023, while new mortgages rose by approximately 30 percent. This suggests

that some of the economic pressures during the war began to shift to household finances, mainly through loans and housing financing, which can be seen from the disruption of global supply chains, rising inflation, weakening productivity, and shocks in strategic sectors such as energy and food (Bank of Israel, 2025).

Values and Attitudes

The Gaza War following the October 7, 2023 attacks has reinforced pre-existing nationalist, ethno-religious, and security-oriented tendencies within Israeli society. The attacks generated a strong sense of collective vulnerability and challenged confidence in deterrence, intelligence, and border protection. Rather than creating an entirely new ideology, the war strengthened tendencies associated with neo-Zionism, particularly the emphasis on Israel as a Jewish state, collective security, and skepticism toward political compromise perceived as threatening national security. This security-oriented environment also increased the legitimacy of more preventive approaches to security. Indeed, post-October 7 assessments of Israeli security doctrine emphasize the need to reassess previous security assumptions and give greater importance to prevention alongside deterrence, warning, defense, and decisive victory (Bar-Tal, 2025).

These changes have also affected Israeli social life and identity beyond Israel. Reserve mobilization, displacement, the hostage crisis, and continuing insecurity have made security increasingly embedded in everyday life, producing what can be understood as the securitization of Israeli social and political life. The effects also extend transnationally. A 2024 survey found that 45 percent of American Jewish respondents felt more connected to Israel following October 7, although responses among diaspora Jews remain politically diverse (AJC, 2024).

The war has simultaneously intensified skepticism toward the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. By 2025, only 21 percent of Israeli adults believed that Israel

and an independent Palestinian state could coexist peacefully, down 14 percentage points from before the war in 2023; lack of mutual trust was also identified by more than seven-in-ten Israelis as a major obstacle to peace (Smerkovich et al., 2025). However, this security-oriented shift has not produced uniform support for continued military operations. In 2024, 62 percent of Israelis identified bringing the hostages home as the primary goal of the war, demonstrating competing understandings of security and state responsibility (Dayan, 2024).

Policy and Governance

In terms of governance and policy, the Gaza war has prompted Israel to make much deeper structural adjustments than just a short-term response, with a shift towards entering a long-term wartime footing with enormous fiscal impacts. Al Jazeera (2026) estimated, the war's cost is estimated to exceed 350 billion shekels by 2025. Therefore, the government is reallocating a massive budget to the defense sector, including a budget increase of more than 70 billion shekels by 2024, with approximately 80 percent allocated to military needs and the war's impact. This reorientation reflects the dominance of the security-first approach in public policy, which simultaneously forces the government to make economic adjustments, such as cutting budgets across sectors and increasing state revenues to close the deficit. In addition, the mobilization of around 300,000 reservists strengthened military capacity but also triggered a domestic labor crisis, especially after restrictions on Palestinian workers impacted the construction and agricultural sectors (Cordall, 2026b).

In an emergency, Israel's state governance underwent significant centralization through the establishment of an emergency government immediately after the October 7, 2023, attack by Hamas. This emergency government was formed to reframe the strategic decision-making of the war by involving key actors across political dimensions so that the country's focus was entirely directed to the military and

security response. Under these conditions, executive power becomes more concentrated, with decisions taken quickly and centrally, which, in practice, limits the space for public dialogue and narrows the normal legislative process. Although this step increases the effectiveness of coordination in crises, the implications for the quality of democracy are significant, especially in terms of transparency and policy accountability. Thus, the establishment of an emergency government reflects how the war is driving the transformation of Israeli governance towards a more centralized and security-oriented model (Michaelson & Sherwood, 2023).

Furthermore, this war marks a fundamental change in the way Israel maintains its security. If Israel previously only tried to contain the threat, it now prefers to prevent it from the beginning by eliminating the threat before it develops (preventive neutralization) (Levornik, 2025). Moreover, the experience of repeated conflicts with Hamas shows that the old strategy of relying on limited military operations is not effective enough to create stability in the long term. Any conflict that ends without a permanent solution triggers a recurring cycle in which both sides re-strengthen their military capabilities (rearmament) so that threats continue to arise. In this context, Israel is increasingly realizing that a strategy based on limited operations and technology alone is insufficient to deal with the dynamics of sustained conflict and war. Therefore, there has been a push towards a more comprehensive and sustainable approach to military capacity, including readiness to deal with long-term conflicts and the need to maintain a sustained strategic advantage. This change indicates a shift from a temporary policy to a more permanent security strategy that can adapt to evolving threats (Kurz et al., 2018).

However, while strengthening the country's capacity, the war also triggered a crisis of political legitimacy. Public trust in the government led by Netanyahu is under pressure due to perceived failures in preventing initial attacks and effectively managing conflicts and wars. This shows that policy changes are not always

accompanied by political stability (Lynch, 2026). Additionally, at the international level, Israel faces serious challenges in maintaining global legitimacy amid widespread criticism of its military policies, which have prompted adjustments to its external diplomacy and communication strategies. Despite the full support of the United States, global perceptions of Israel are deteriorating and triggering a crisis of credibility, especially under the leadership of Netanyahu (Saikal, 2025).

Power

The Gaza War triggered a significant change in Israel's power dynamics, both domestically and internationally, as well as changing the configuration of the alliance that has been supporting the country's strategic position. Domestically, this war deepens the legitimacy crisis of Netanyahu's government, which is facing great pressure due to the intelligence failure on October 7 and the criticism of the prolonged handling of the war (Cordall, 2025).

Large-scale demonstrations have occurred almost every week since the end of 2023, involving tens of thousands of Israelis demanding new elections and government accountability in the wake of the 2023 Hamas offensive, which resulted in the deaths of 1,221 Israelis (AFP, 2025). Netanyahu is widely considered to bear the primary responsibility for the tragedy. His popularity and that of his Likud party plummeted from 32 to 19 seats in the polls, and 66 percent of Israelis wanted him to step down. Netanyahu is considered to have weakened military readiness by triggering widespread disagreements among military reservists who refused to attend conscription (Lovatt, 2024).

Netanyahu has also been criticized for supporting Hamas by agreeing to successive ceasefire agreements that have allowed the flow of Qatari cash into Gaza, some of which has been used to support civil servants employed by Hamas. Tensions also emerged between the government and the military, with several former high-

ranking Israeli Defense Forces officials openly criticizing the war strategy and judging that Netanyahu's leadership put his personal political interests above national security (Lovatt, 2024). These tensions led the Israeli military to dismiss three generals and take disciplinary action against several other senior officers for their failure to prevent the October 2023 attack (AFP, 2025).

At the international level, the Gaza war changed the course of Israel's diplomatic relations and affected its negotiating position with Egypt. The full support of the United States remains a pillar of Israel's security, but relations between the two countries have been strained after the Joe Biden administration faced domestic and international pressure due to the high number of civilian casualties in Gaza. This pressure has led Washington to delay the delivery of certain ammunition and issue harsher statements regarding Israeli military operations (Nurhadi, 2024). In Europe, several countries, such as Spain, Ireland, Belgium, and Norway, have taken a more critical stance against Israel, even pushing for the official recognition of the Palestinian state as a diplomatic step against Israel's military policy. From 2024 to 2025, 145 out of 193 countries recognized the state of Palestine, including 15 European countries, such as the United Kingdom and France, which have long supported Israel and are the main allies of the United States (Asmar, 2026).

Diplomatic isolation is also seen at the UN; in September 2024, 124 countries voted in the UN General Assembly for a resolution calling on Israel to comply with international law, withdraw its military forces from the Occupied Palestinian Territories, halt settlement activities, evacuate all settlers from occupied land, and dismantle the separation wall in the West Bank. Only 14 votes were against and 43 abstained (Asmar, 2026). The General Assembly's support continued in the General Assembly session in September 2025, which supported the recognition of the state of Palestine as an independent state. Of the 193 UN member states, 142 supported the resolution, 10 were against it, and 12 abstained (CNN Indonesia, 2025).

In July 2024, the ICJ ruled that Israeli settlement activities in the Palestinian territories violate international law and that Israel's occupation of the Palestinian territories is a de facto annexation that violates the rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination (Prasetyo, 2024). The court urged Israel to cease settlement activities in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem and end its "illegal" occupation of the territory and the Gaza Strip as soon as possible. Israel must also evacuate all its settlers from the West Bank and East Jerusalem and pay compensation to the Palestinians for the damage caused by the occupation. Although this court's decision is not legally binding, it still has significant political weight because it is the first time in the last 57 years that the ICJ has taken a clear position on the legality of the occupation. This decision was made after the UN General Assembly asked the ICJ to examine and decide the case (Berg, 2024).

Regional political dynamics have also changed significantly. Arab countries that were previously close to normalizing relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords are now suspending the process of normalization. Saudi Arabia froze normalization talks and demanded the establishment of a Palestinian state as a prerequisite, which directly undermined Israel's strategy to expand its diplomatic network in the Middle East (Riswan, 2025). In addition, the Arab public is also united in a tough stance condemning Israel's actions against Gaza, and public support for normalization with Israel declined post-October 7, including in countries that signed the Abraham Accords. In the seven countries surveyed by the Arab Barometer in 2023-2024, none had support exceeding 13 percent. In Morocco, which normalized relations with Israel in 2020, support fell from 31 percent in 2022 to 13 percent after October 7, 2023 (Robbins & Jamal, 2023).

During the 2024–2026 period, the active involvement of regional actors such as the Houthis of Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Iran significantly expanded the spectrum of threats and losses to Israel. Hezbollah's northern offensive and the Houthi

disruption of maritime routes in the Red Sea not only created constant security pressure but also inflicted massive material and economic losses through infrastructure damage and disruption of global supply chains. The escalation of direct tensions with Iran further exacerbated Israel's defense burden, forcing the government to allocate significant financial and military resources for air defense systems and troop mobilization. This dynamic directly disrupted domestic stability, created a wave of internal displacement in border areas, and prolonged the conflict, deepening the humanitarian crisis and causing a long-term economic slowdown for the country (Reuters, 2026).

The Gaza War triggered a multidimensional ripple effect that spread widely throughout Israel's domestic and international systems. This wave of impact began with the loss of life, physical injuries, and the deployment of hundreds of thousands of reserve soldiers, crippling the national workforce and reducing the human capabilities of Israeli society due to the high burden of psychological trauma. These impacts then spread to the economic sector through declining growth, a swelling fiscal deficit due to military spending, a decline in tourism, and disruptions to global supply chains due to maritime security threats in the Red Sea. At the political and social levels, sharp domestic polarization emerged over the government's inability to free hostages, the centralization of executive power that ignored democratic transparency, and the deterioration of Israel's international image due to diplomatic isolation and legal sanctions from institutions such as the ICJ and the ICC.

These waves of impact then reversed, producing a washback effect that limited and dictated the direction of Israeli policy, particularly regarding the ceasefire. Internally, intense public pressure from a frustrated citizenry and a crisis of economic and social resilience forced the Israeli government to reach a war plateau. Externally and regionally, global diplomatic pressure, the freezing of the Abraham Accords normalization process by Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, and prolonged military

disputes on various fronts—such as attacks by Hezbollah in the north and the Houthis in the Red Sea—seriously strained Israel’s combat and logistical capabilities. These multiple pressures ultimately weakened the legitimacy of military operations and pushed Israel to shift its geopolitical strategy toward a ceasefire agreement.

This dynamic also has a significant washback effect on the United States, Israel’s main ally. The United States faces a geopolitical dilemma due to its diplomatic isolation on the international stage, where its support for Israel has sparked widespread opposition from Global South countries and most UN members. Domestically, the United States is experiencing strong political polarization among young voters and citizens demanding an end to military aid. Furthermore, the United States is forced to bear increased fiscal burdens and security risks due to the need to schedule additional military operations in the Red Sea to secure international trade routes, ultimately complicating its strategic position in the Middle East.

CONCLUSION

This study concludes that the Gaza War was a transformative shock that had cascading impacts on Israel through ripple and washback mechanisms. The ripple effects occurred simultaneously on six levels: loss of life and material damage, decreased human capabilities, economic contraction and disruption of global supply chains, social polarization and shifts in public perception, centralization of executive power that weakened democratic accountability, and a shift in Israel’s international bargaining position. These impacts then generated a washback effect that fundamentally limited Israel’s geopolitical maneuverability. Domestic pressure from frustrated citizens, multi-front military escalation (Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis), diplomatic isolation, legal sanctions from the ICJ and the ICC, and pressure from key allies like the United States proved to be a war of attrition. This series of

dynamics ultimately dictated Israel's decision to change its military strategy and accept a ceasefire policy.

This research extends the applicability of the ripple and washback effects of war concept (Bocquillon et al., 2024) that was originally developed in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian War to analyze asymmetric and multi-front conflicts in the Middle East. The study demonstrates the effectiveness of this framework in explaining how war shocks impact not only the immediate combat zone but also create systemic feedback loops that can alter the political behavior of third-party states and aggressors. Further research recommendations could also examine in more depth the shift in foreign policy of the United States and European Union countries, particularly in relation to the project of normalizing Arab-Israeli relations (Abraham Accords) and the consensus on a two-state solution.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The authors would like to express their deepest gratitude to the Directorate of Research and Community Service (DPPM) of Universitas Islam Indonesia (UII) for their support and assistance in facilitating the implementation of this research. This research was carried out based on the DPPM UII Research Contract, Number: 64/WR 1/70/DPPM/I/2026, with the Institutional Development Research grant scheme. The support of DPPM UII is invaluable for the success of this research, especially in terms of funding, facilities, and guidance during the research process.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- AFP. (2025, November 27). *Netanyahu accused of dodging blame as Israel confronts Oct 7 failures / Arab News Japan*. https://www.arabnews.jp/en/middle-east/article_159648/
- AJC. (2024, May). *AJC's 2024 Survey of American Jewish Opinion*. AJC. https://www.ajc.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2024-06/AJC-2024-Survey-of-American-Jewish-Opinion-Methodology-Report_5.2024.pdf

-
- Ali, M. (2025, September 23). *Which are the 150+ countries that have recognised Palestine as of 2025?* | United Nations News | Al Jazeera. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/23/which-are-the-150-countries-that-have-recognised-palestine-as-of-2025>
- Al Jazeera. (2025, November 29). *Gaza death toll surpasses 70,000 as Israel keeps up attacks despite truce* | Gaza News | Al Jazeera. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/11/29/israeli-attack-kills-two-children-in-southern-gaza-despite-ceasefire>
- Asmar, A. (2026, February 18). *Israel needs a fundamental shift in its foreign policy - Atlantic Council*. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/israel-needs-a-fundamental-shift-in-its-foreign-policy/>
- Aswar, H., Hudaifi, I., Heryana, A. I., Khairul, I., & Hawari, M. (2025). From Protests to Petitions: The Global Response to the Gaza Crisis Since October 2023. *Jisiera: The Journal of Islamic Studies and International Relations*, 8(1), 66–82. <https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.15206360>
- Bank of Israel. (2025). *Annual Report 2024*. <https://www.boi.org.il/en/>
- Bar-Tal, D. (2025). Daniel Bar-Tal, on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, before and after October 7, 2023: In conversation with James Liu and Veronica Hopner. *Political Psychology*, 46(6), 1419–1439. <https://doi.org/10.1111/POPS.13055>
- Berg, R. (2024, July 19). *ICJ says Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories is illegal*. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjerjzxlvpdo>
- Berman, L. (2025). *For now, victory is still within reach: 10 truths about the Gaza war, 20 months in The Times of Israel*. <https://www.timesofisrael.com/for-now-victory-still-in-reach-10-truths-about-the-gaza-war-20-months-in/>
- Bocquillon, P., Doyle, S., S. James, T., Mason, R., Park, S., & Rosina, M. (2024). The effects of wars: lessons from the war in Ukraine. *Policy Studies*, 45(3–4), 261–281. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2024.2334458>
- Butter, D. (2024). *Economic Impact of the Gaza War: IEMed*. <https://www.iemed.org/publication/economic-impact-of-the-gaza-war/>
- Chiim, A. (2026, February 26). *Ed. Ministry to cancel school in case of Iran attacks* | The Jerusalem Post. <https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-888059>
- CNN Indonesia. (2025, September 13). *142 Negara Dukung Pengakuan Palestina Merdeka di Majelis Umum PBB*. <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/internasional/20250913143246-134-1273315/142-negara-dukung-pengakuan-palestina-merdeka-di-majelis-umum-pbb>

-
- Columbia Psychiatry. (2024, January 5). *PTSD, Depression, and Anxiety Nearly Doubles in Israel in Aftermath of Hamas Attack* | Columbia University Department of Psychiatry. <https://www.columbiapsychiatry.org/news/ptsd-depression-and-anxiety-nearly-doubles-israel-aftermath-october-7-2023-terrorist-attack>
- Cordall, S. S. (2025, December 20). *Netanyahu finally announces October 7 inquiry: Why are Israelis furious?* | Israel-Palestine conflict News | Al Jazeera. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/12/20/netanyahu-finally-announces-october-7-inquiry-why-are-israelis-furious>
- Cordall, S. S. (2026a, February 19). *The cost of genocide: Israel's war on Gaza by the numbers* | Israel-Palestine conflict News | Al Jazeera. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/19/the-cost-of-genocide-israels-war-on-gaza-by-the-numbers>
- Cordall, S. S. (2026b, February 19). *The cost of genocide: Israel's war on Gaza by the numbers* | Israel-Palestine conflict News | Al Jazeera. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/19/the-cost-of-genocide-israels-war-on-gaza-by-the-numbers>
- Dayan, L. (2024, May 7). *Majority of Israelis Prioritize Hamas Hostage Deal Over Rafah Operation, IDI Poll Finds*. Haaretz. <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-05-07/ty-article/.premium/majority-of-israelis-prioritize-hamas-hostage-deal-over-rafah-operation-idi-poll-finds/0000018f-5364-dcda-abcf-7b679a700000>
- El Kurd, D. (2024, April 30). *Although Limited, Arab Public Protests Against the War in Gaza Continue*. <https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/although-limited-arab-public-protests-against-the-war-in-gaza-continue/>
- Etkes, H., & Feldman, N. (2024). *The Impact of Houthis Attacks on International Trade: Is Israel an Exception?* 1.
- Ewelike, S. C., Okon, I. I., Achor, E. C., Akpan, U. U., Akilimali, A., & Lucero-Prisno, D. E. (2024). The effects of war on healthcare delivery, access, and equity: a critical examination of the Israel–Gaza case study. *International Journal of Surgery: Global Health*, 7(6). <https://doi.org/10.1097/GH9.0000000000000488>
- Frankel, J. (2024, August 26). *Israel's economy is struggling. Economists say ending the war would help* | AP News. <https://apnews.com/article/israel-war-economy-hamas-gaza-deficit-smotrich-f647a0436bae20dca2129e02814068a6>
- Gritten, D. (2024, November 22). *ICC issues arrest warrants for Netanyahu, Gallant and Hamas commander*. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cly2exvx944o>
- Holcman, T. (2025, December 30). *IDF reveals 151 soldiers lost their lives during 2025* | The Jerusalem Post. <https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/article-881831>

-
- Humaid, M., & Salhani, J. (2025). *Analysis: Hamas has been hit hard by Israel, but is not out in Gaza* | *Israel-Palestine conflict News* | *Al Jazeera*. Al-Jazeera. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/29/analysis-hamas-has-been-hit-hard-by-israel-but-is-not-out-in-gaza>
- IMF Communications Department. (2026, February 5). *Israel: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2026 Article IV Mission*. <https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2026/02/05/mcs-02052026-israel-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2026-article-iv-mission>
- Ince, C., Eren Üniversitesi, B., Fakültesi, F.-E., & Bölümü, S. (2024). The Israel War as a Social Disaster and The Forced Migration of Palestinians. *Toplum Ekonomi ve Yönetim Dergisi*, 5(Filistin), 1–18. <https://doi.org/10.58702/TEYD.1569619>
- International Trade Administration. (2026, March 17). *Israel - Energy*. <https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/israel-energy>
- Jewish Federations. (2024, July 8). *Jewish Federations support 16 new mental health facilities in Israel* | *The Jewish Federations of North America*. Jewish Federations. <https://www.jewishfederations.org/blog/all/jewish-federations-support-16-new-mental-health-facilities-in-israel-471175>
- Jones, D. (2024, September 21). *Turkish youth finds common cause in protests against trade with Israel - International report - RFI*. <https://www.rfi.fr/en/podcasts/international-report/20240921-turkish-youth-finds-common-cause-in-protests-against-trade-with-israel>
- J.P. Morgan. (2024, February 8). *The Impacts of the Red Sea Shipping Crisis* . <https://www.jpmorgan.com/insights/global-research/supply-chain/red-sea-shipping>
- Kaim, A., Siman Tov, M., Kimhi, S., Marciano, H., Eshel, Y., & Adini, B. (2025). Predictors of societal and individual resilience across two and a half years of varied adversities. *Scientific Reports*, 15(1). <https://doi.org/10.1038/S41598-025-00854-1>
- Khalil, Z. (2025, January 19). *Hamas wins Gaza war, Israel fails to achieve its goals: Ex-Israeli general*. <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/hamas-wins-gaza-war-israel-fails-to-achieve-its-goals-ex-israeli-general/3455647>
- Kumparan News. (2024, June 3). *Kerusakan Infrastruktur Imbas Perang Gaza: Tersisa 14 RS, 60% Rumah Rusak*. <https://kumparan.com/kumparannews/kerusakan-infrastruktur-imbis-perang-gaza-tersisa-14-rs-60-rumah-rusak-22rjaIzCBWO>
- Kurz, A., Dekel, U., & Berti, B. (2018). *The Crisis of the Gaza Strip: A Way Out*.
- Lehmann, N., & ToI Staff. (2025, December 7). *Weekly anti-government protests take center stage after end of weekly hostage rallies* | *The Times of Israel*.

-
- <https://www.timesofisrael.com/weekly-anti-government-protests-take-center-stage-after-end-of-weekly-hostage-rallies/>
- Levornik, Z. (2025, December 3). *Israel in the Middle East: From a Policy of Containment to a Preemptive Policy* - Alma Research and Education Center. https://israel-alma.org/israel-in-the-middle-east-from-a-policy-of-containment-to-a-preemptive-policy/?__cf_chl_f_tk=mfZ4FHKcVRp1W.tNIHmiWjeZuhG6Cp_jBif2lAKm08-1782785779-1.0.1.1-xcRhbxRdNyDUyGMUEtO81Uy3237DyohRiOp_31wbMko
- Lovatt, H. (2024). *The Gaza Conflict and Israel's Domestic Politics*: IEMed. <https://www.iemed.org/publication/the-gaza-conflict-and-israels-domestic-politics/>
- Lynch, M. (2026, April 15). *From Gaza to Lebanon to Iran, Israel's Post-Oct. 7 Security Doctrine Has Failed*. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/04/15/israel-gaza-iran-lebanon-syria-hamas-strategy-doctrine-war/>
- Masitoh, D., Masitoh, D., Putri, A. S., & Aswar, H. (2025). Public Cosmopolitanism vs State Nationalism: A Comparative Study of State and Public Responses to The Gaza Genocide Since 2023. *MUKADIMAH: Jurnal Pendidikan, Sejarah, Dan Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial*, 9(2), 529–543. <https://doi.org/10.30743/mkd.v9i2.11755>
- Mayer, Y., Shiffman, N., Bergmann, E., Nator, M., Khazen, S., Lurie, I., & Enav, Y. (2024). Mental Health Outcomes of Arab and Jewish Populations in Israel a Month after the Mass Trauma Events of October 7, 2023: A Cross-Sectional Survey of a Representative Sample. *Psychiatry Research*, 339, 116042. <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.PSYCHRES.2024.116042>
- Mevorach, T., de la Fontaine, N., Stephanie Skavenski, V. W., Cohen, A. S., Chokroverty, L., & Benaroya-Milshtein, N. (2025). Protecting children in crisis: An integrated approach to mass trauma response - clinical innovations, systems coordination, and evidence-based interventions. *Psychiatry Research*, 353, 116757. <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.PSYCHRES.2025.116757>
- Michaelson, R., & Sherwood, H. (2023, October 12). *Netanyahu sets up emergency Israeli unity government and war cabinet* | Israel | *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/11/netanyahu-sets-up-emergency-israeli-unity-government-and-war-cabinet>
- Nurhadi, M. (2024, May 6). *AS Hentikan Pengiriman Suplai Militer Israel Akibat Tekanan Politik*. <https://www.suara.com/news/2024/05/06/122018/as-hentikan-pengiriman-suplai-militer-israel-akibat-tekanan-politik>
- OECD. (2025). *OECD Economic Surveys: Israel 2025*. *OECD Economic Surveys: Israel, 2025*. <https://doi.org/10.1787/D6DD02BC-EN>

-
- Prasetyo, A. (2024, July 20). *Mahkamah Internasional Anggap Pendudukan Israel Atas Palestina Illegal*. Hukum Online .
<https://www.hukumonline.com/berita/a/mahkamah-internasional-anggap-pendudukan-israel-atas-palestina-ilegal-lt669baee22cec9/>
- Republika. (2024, May 9). *Israel Robohkan Puluhan Rumah Badui di Negev* . Republika.
<https://republika.id/posts/52637/israel-robokkan-puluhan-rumah-badui-di-negev>
- Reuters. (2023a, November 2). *Israel Lowers Gas Exports With Tamar Field Shut*.
<https://gcaptain.com/israel-lowers-gas-exports-with-tamar-field-shut/>
- Reuters. (2023b, November 10). *Israel revises Hamas attack death toll to “around 1,200”* | Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-revises-death-toll-oct-7-hamas-attack-around-1200-2023-11-10/>
- Reuters. (2024, January 23). *Gaza: Israel loses 24 soldiers, its highest one-day death toll* | Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-military-says-21-soldiers-killed-gaza-fighting-2024-01-23/>
- Reuters. (2026, March 4). *Damage to Israeli economy from Iran war seen at about \$3 billion a week*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/damage-israeli-economy-iran-war-could-top-29-billion-week-ministry-says-2026-03-04/>
- Riswan, K. K. (2025, July 29). *Saudi tolak normalisasi dengan Israel kecuali ada negara Palestina* - ANTARA News. <https://www.antaranews.com/berita/4998861/saudi-tolak-normalisasi-dengan-israel-kecuali-ada-negara-palestina>
- Robbins, M., & Jamal, A. A. (2023, June 23). *Foreign Affairs: Arab Public Opinion Constrains Normalization with Israel – Arab Barometer*.
<https://www.arabbarometer.org/media-news/press-release-foreign-affairs-article-how-arab-public-opinion-constrains-normalization-with-israel/>
- Saikal, A. (2025). *As Netanyahu moves toward full takeover of Gaza, Israel faces a crisis of international credibility*. <https://doi.org/10.64628/AA.67EMT353F>
- Scheer, S. (2025, May 15). *Israel inflation rate jumps to 3.6% in April in surprise gain* | Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-inflation-rate-jumps-36-april-surprise-gain-2025-05-15/>
- Scheer, S., & Rabinovich, A. (2023, October 23). *Israel economy: Gaza war sends economy into the unknown* | Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/existential-shock-war-sends-israeli-economy-into-unknown-2023-10-24/>
- Schein, A. (2024). The effects of the Gaza War on Israel’s economy: one year on. *Israel Affairs*, 30(5), 925–938. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2024.2422157>

-
- Segaloff, J. (2025, August 8). *Miracle at Soroka: How a frontline hospital weathered October 7, survived Iran war*. The Jerusalem Post. <https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-863459>
- Seker, A. U. (2024, February 18). *Attacks on Gaza may cost Israel billions of dollars*. <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/attacks-on-gaza-may-cost-israel-billions-of-dollars/3140789>
- Smerkovich, M., Starr, K. J., & Prozorovsky, A. (2025, June 3). *Israeli Public Increasingly Skeptical About Lasting Peace* | Pew Research Center. <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2025/06/03/israeli-public-is-increasingly-skeptical-about-lasting-peace/>
- Sobelman, D. (2026). The Strategic Origins of Hamas's October 7 Attack. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 1–28. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2026.2613426>
- State Comptroller of Israel. (2025, July). *Audit Reports on Local Government 2025*. State Comptroller of Israel. <https://library.mevaker.gov.il/sites/DigitalLibrary/Documents/2025/Shilton/EN/2025-Shilton-All-Reports-EN.pdf>
- Tookey, J. (2025, October 27). *83% bangunan Gaza musnah: Tak hanya butuh uang untuk membangun ulang*. <https://theconversation.com/83-bangunan-gaza-musnah-tak-hanya-butuh-uang-untuk-membangun-ulang-267747>
- UNICEF. (2025, July 16). *UNICEF Executive Director Catherine Russell's remarks on the humanitarian situation for children in Gaza at the UN Security Council meeting*. <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/unicef-executive-director-catherine-russells-remarks-humanitarian-situation-children>
- Youssef, A. M. A. R., & Shehada, F. M. F. (2025). Escalating Risks of the Israel Conflict on Gaza and Affected Fragile Countries. *Global Journal of Emerging Trend in Education and Social Science* (ISSN: 2582-1377), 8(1). <https://stm.eurekajournals.com/index.php/GJETESS/article/view/592>